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Inequality and Happiness:
Are Europeans and Americans Different?
Abstract
The answer to the question posed in the title is “yes.”  Using a total of 128,106 answers to a survey
question about “happiness,” we find that there is a large, negative and significant effect of inequality
on happiness in Europe but not in the US.  There are two potential explanations. First, Europeans
prefer more equal societies (inequality belongs in the utility function for Europeans but not for
Americans). Second, social mobility is (or is perceived to be) higher in the US so being poor is not
seen as affecting future income. We test these hypotheses by partitioning the sample across income
and ideological lines. There is evidence of “inequality generated” unhappiness in the US only for a
sub-group of rich leftists. In Europe inequality makes the poor unhappy, as well as the leftists. This
favors the hypothesis that inequality affects European happiness because of their lower social
mobility (since no preference for equality exists amongst the rich or the right). The results help
explain the greater popular demand for government to fight inequality in Europe relative to the US.
Alberto Alesina Rafael Di Tella Robert MacCulloch
Harvard University,
NBER and CEPR
Harvard Business School London School of Economics3
1. Introduction
Most governments redistribute income, using both direct and indirect means.  Even though this role
of the public sector has increased vastly in the last few decades in all industrial countries, European
governments are more heavily involved with redistribution than that of the United States.  European
fiscal systems are more progressive than those in the United States and the welfare state is more
widespread in Europe, where the share of government in the economy is substantially larger than in
the United States.  For instance, in 1996 the share of total government spending (excluding interest
payments) over GDP was about 30 percent in the US, versus 44 percent in Europe.  The share of
transfers over GDP was about 14 percent in the US and about 22 percent in Europe.
1  The share of
transfers over GDP was less than 1 percent in Europe and the US at the end of the nineteenth
century, and it was about 6 percent of GDP in the US, and about 10 percent of GDP in Europe in
1960.  The growth of transfers explains almost all of the difference in the size of government
between Europe and the US.
If truly democratic governments redistribute so much, it must mean that a large fraction of the
population favors these programs.  For a start, the “poor” should be in favor of redistribution, since
they gain from it on net.  However, this preference is mitigated by the fact that the poor of today
may become the rich of tomorrow and they may not want to be in the future the ones who will
support redistributive schemes.  Therefore, social mobility should influence how many individuals
like redistributive polices.
2  Beyond self-interest, however, inequality (which is often associated with
high poverty rates) may be perceived as a social evil.  That is, at least up to a point, even the net
losers from redistributive schemes may favor them because they perceive poverty and inequality as
social harms.  In part this may also be motivated by self-interest, to the extent that inequality breeds
crime and threats to property rights.  But, even beyond that, the observation (or perception) of
poverty may negatively affect the welfare of the rich and their sense of fairness.
In this paper, we explore whether and why inequality negatively affects individual utility even after
controlling for individual income.  We measure “utility” in terms of survey answers about
                                                       
1 For historical data on the growth of redistributive programs in industrial countries, see Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000).
2 See Benabou and Ok (2000) for a precise theoretical formulation of this idea and Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) for
empirical tests.4
“happiness.”  Some readers may feel uncomfortable using such a vague question like “are you
happy?” for any useful statistical investigation.  As we discuss below, however, a growing literature
both in psychology and in economics successfully uses it, and the patterns observed in the answers
to this question are reasonable and quite similar across countries.  This gives us confidence in the
significance of using such data to study inequality.
We find some intriguing results.  First, Europeans seem to strongly dislike inequality, while there is
no evidence that Americans are affected by it. Second, the European aversion to inequality is more
concentrated in certain groups.  Those who define themselves leftist, for example, show a strong
distaste for inequality, while those who define themselves as right wing are unaffected by it.  Third,
the breakdown of rich versus poor shows a clear difference between Europe and the US.  In
Europe, the happiness of the poor is strongly negatively affected by inequality, while the rich are
unaffected.  In the US, one finds that the only group that seems to be negatively affected by
inequality are the rich leftists.  There are two potential interpretations for our finding that Europeans
dislike inequality while there are no strong effects in the US.  The first one involves taste: the results
simply reflect a higher “taste” for equality and social harmony in Europe relative to the US.  That is,
equality enters the utility functions of Europeans, but has a weaker role in that of Americans.  In this
sense “equality” would be like a luxury good since the share of government transfers is increasing in
GDP in cross country samples, but Europeans care more than Americans abut this particular
luxury.
3
However this interpretation does not seem consistent with our results on the differences in the
effect of inequality across income/ideological groups within Europe.  The “taste for equality” should
be found in high-income groups, if equality is likely to be a “luxury” good.  Yet it is the happiness of
the poor, not the rich that is negatively affected by inequality in Europe.
A more plausible interpretation is in terms of differences in social mobility.  If the US is a more
mobile society than Europe, where people have more opportunities to move up (or down), then
present day inequality levels may have little influence on individual utility.  Inequality in such cases is
a poor indicator of what the future awaits.  Note that inequality in this case does not belong in the
utility function directly but it proxies for the likelihood that individuals will keep their place in5
society in future periods.  Consistent with the hypothesis that Europe is (or is perceived to be) less
mobile than the US, we find a significantly more negative coefficient on inequality in the happiness
regressions for the European poor relative to the US. Note that data problems have made
conclusive tests involving social mobility almost impossible, as noted by Atkinson, Bourgignon and
Morrison (1992).
4
Given that European citizens seem so averse to inequality, they should favor redistributive policies,
i.e. the welfare state.  Broadly speaking this is the message of Boeri, Borsch-Syupan and Tabellini
(2000).  In a survey conducted in three European countries they find that Germans, Italians and
Spaniards are reluctant to favor cuts in welfare programs, even though they show a lack of clear
understanding of the costs associated with them namely, they tend to understate the costs.  Di Tella
and MacCulloch (1996) find a desire for higher unemployment benefits in 5 out of 6 European
countries (the exception being Norway) and a desire for lower or equal unemployment benefits in
the United States and Australia.
The present paper is at the crossroads of two lines of research.  One is the study of the determinants
of “happiness”.  The economic literature started with Easterlin (1974), who documented stagnant
average happiness levels in the US in the face of large increases in income, a question recently taken
up by Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) and Inglehart (1996).
5  A number of subsequent papers have
focused on micro economic aspects, including the role of being unemployed on self reported well
being (Clark and Oswald (1994), Winkelman and Winkelman (1991)).  Di Tella, MacCulloch and
Oswald (1997) show that the country-level “micro happiness” regressions display a very similar
structure across 12 OECD countries.  That paper also takes a macro perspective by including
aggregate unemployment and a measure of the generosity of the welfare state in these happiness
regressions.  Other work has used happiness data to study the role of democratic institutions
(Granato, Inglehart and Leblang (1996) and Frey and Stutzer (1999, 2000)), the inflation-
unemployment trade-off (Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (1999)), partisan versus opportunistic
                                                                                                                                                                                  
3 See Thurow (1971) for a discussion of  equality as a luxury good.
4 However, in an interesting comparison, Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999) find that social mobility is higher in
the US than in Italy.  Bjorklund and Janiti (1997) find inconclusive results in their comparison of Sweden and the
US.  Gottschalk and Spolaore (2000) argue that the relative amount of social mobility between the US and Germany
may be different at different levels of the income scale.
5 There is, to be sure, a large literature in psychology using self reported measures of well being (see Diener, Suh, Lucas
and Smith (1999) and Kahneman, Diener and Schwartz (1999)).6
models (Di Tella and MacCulloch (1998)), entrepreneurship (Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)) and
the role of social norms (Stutzer and Lalive (2000)).  An interesting early paper by Morawetz et al
(1973) discusses how average happiness varies across two communities in Israel that have different
levels of inequality.
6
The second line of research is the literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution.
On the theoretical side some of the key papers are Romer (1977) and Meltzer and Richards (1981)
on inequality and redistributions, and Piketty (1995) and Benabou and Ok (2000) on social mobility.
Recent empirical work on the demand for redistribution includes Alesina and La Ferrara (2000),
Ravallion and Loshkin (2000), Corneo (2000) and Corneo and Gruner (2000).  These papers find,
looking at the data from the US, Europe and in one case, Russia, that social mobility does affect the
preference for redistribution.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes our data set.  Section 3 presents results for
the US.  Section 4 present results for European countries. In Section 5 we compare results for the
US and Europe.  The last section concludes.
2. The data
2.1 Description
The analysis examines U.S. happiness data from the United States General Social Survey (1972-
1994).  We use the happiness question that reads "Taken all together, how would you say things are these
days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” (Small "Don't know" and "No
answer" categories are not studied here).  This was asked in each of 23 years and we use the
responses of 24,333 individuals.
For Europe, the source of happiness data is the Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1975-1992), which
interviews a random sample of Europeans in each year and asked two questions, among others, that
interest us.  The first is "Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days – would you say
                                                       
6 Our paper, and we believe much of the happiness literature, can be understood as an application of experienced utility, a
concept that emphasises the pleasures derived from consumption (discussed in Kahneman and Thaler (1991)). It argues,
in essence, that there are circumstances where measures of experienced utility can be derived (such as happiness
responses) that are reasonable substitutes to observing individual choices. Ng (1996) discusses the theoretical structure
of subjective well-being responses while Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) propose a formal axiomatic defense of
experienced utility (see also Tinbergen (1991) and van Praag (1991)).7
you're very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy these days?" (small "Don't know" and "No answer"
categories are not studied here).  The surveys also report the answers of 273,386 individuals over 18
years to a “life satisfaction” question.  This question is included because the word “happy” translates
imprecisely across languages.  This question is: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?” (The small "Don't know" and "No answer" categories
are not studied here).  We focus on life satisfaction data because they are available for a longer
period of time (from 1975 to 1991 instead of just 1975 to 1986).  “Happiness” and “life satisfaction”
are highly correlated.
Because we are interested in comparing our results for Europe with those for the US, we coded the
European data into similar categories.  Since we have three categories for the US and four for
Europe, we collapsed European responses that fell into the two middle categories (fairly satisfied
and not very satisfied) into one.  In any case, very similar results obtain when the four categories are
used for Europe.  Appendix 1 describes both the U.S. General Social Survey and the Euro-
Barometer Survey Series in greater detail.
For the United States, we take Gini coefficients of gross family income for each State from the US
Census Bureau.  For Europe, we use Gini coefficients from the Deininger and Squire (1996) data
set.  We use only part of their “high quality” data.  These data satisfy three minimum standards of
quality: they are based on household surveys, the population covered is representative of the entire
country and the measure of income (or expenditure) used is comprehensive including income from
self-employment, non-wage earnings as well as non-monetary income.  The data set is normally
considered the best available for cross-country comparison and it is widely used.  However, it is not
without its drawbacks, as discussed by Atkinson and Brandolini (1999).  The problems concern the
fact that the Gini coefficients for different countries have not all been calculated using the same
methods.  For example, some are based on gross income, while others use net (disposable) income.
In our sample, 3 observations for Denmark, 3 observations for France and 4 observations for
Germany are based on gross income whereas the rest are based on net income.  In addition,
although Deininger and Squire’s (1996) data set is largely based on the household as the choice of
reference unit, some measurements are based at the individual level.  Another difference between
the country time series of Gini coefficients is that some use expenditure whereas others use income.
In order to minimise problems caused by the differences in definitions and sources, we use only8
consistent time series of their “high quality” data within each country.  The remaining differences in
the bases used to estimate inequality across countries are at least partially controlled for by including
country dummies.  The definitions and sources of other variables used in the paper are described in
Appendix 1.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report some basic statistics for our US and European samples.  Concerning
“happiness,” the patterns across Europe and the US seem similar, which is somewhat reassuring that
the question is interpreted similarly in the two places.  For a start, the breakdown between different
levels of happiness in the sample is fairly similar in Europe and the US.  For instance, about 54 per
cent in Europe and 56 per cent in the US are in the intermediate category.  Patterns of happiness
and marital status are similar.  Interestingly, personal income seems to have a stronger effect in the
US than in Europe, an observation consistent with a larger share of public consumption and more
progressive taxation in Europe than in the US.
2.2 Discussion of “happiness data”
Many readers may worry about using answers to questions like “are you happy?” for any rigorous
statistical work.  While a healthy dose of scepticism is always useful, there are good reasons why
these “happiness” data should not be dismissed.
The first reason is based on the fact that psychologists, who study well-being for a living widely, use
these data.  Presumably, people who insist on using bad data would be driven out of the market.  A
second argument is that well-being data pass what psychologists often call validation exercises.
Happiness responses are correlated with physical reactions that can be thought of as describing true,
internal happiness.  Pavot (1991), and Eckman, Davidson and Friesen (1990), for example, find that
individuals reporting to be very happy tend to smile more.  Shedler, Mayman and Manis (1993) show
that happiness data are negatively correlated with heart rate and blood pressure measures of
responses to stress.  Sutton and Davidson (1997) show that happiness data are positively correlated
with electroencephalogram measures of prefrontal brain activity (the part of the brain that is
“responsible” for happiness).  Other studies include Fordyce (1988), who shows that the different
measures of well-being correlate well with one another, Seidlitz, Wyer and Diener (1997) who show
that happiness data are correlated with subject recall of positive life events; Diener (1984) and11
from 1975 to 1984, whereas the second period uses the 1989 measure of State inequality as our
estimate of inequality over the years from 1985 to 1994.8  We begin in column 1 with a regression
that includes only the individual characteristics of the respondent.  We start by including state
dummies (but not year dummies yet, they will come later).
The results are sensible and provide some confidence in the structure of the responses to the
happiness question.  First of all, money does bring happiness, as the coefficients on income show.
The omitted quartile is the first and the coefficients show that happiness is monotonically increasing
in income.  Even after controlling for income, more educated individuals are happier.  On the other
hand, being unemployed brings unhappiness, above and beyond an income effect.
The results on marital status are consistent with the sociological and medical literature, which show
that married individuals live longer and are healthier.  The omitted category is “never married,” and
we find married individuals are happier than unmarried ones; divorced, separated and widowers are
less happy then “never married,” and, a fortiori, much less happy than married individuals.  Note
that one may argue that there might be a problem of reverse causality: happy and optimistic
individuals may be more likely to marry and stay married because they are better at building
relationships.  We are not interested in precisely establishing causality here.  For us, what really
matters is that the association between “happiness” and marital status is consistent with evidence
drawn from other sources.
There is a non linear effect of age: the happiest decades seem to be the thirties/forties, when
“growing pains” are over, and old age has not settled in yet.  On the other hand, controlling for age,
retirement is not bad.  Children seem to bring about preoccupations, stress and hard work as the
negative coefficients on this variable show.  Finally, women seem happier than men, and, not
surprisingly, a traditionally discriminated minority (blacks) are less happy.  All these results seem
quite sensible and are consistent with the literature.
9
                                                       
8 Our results are robust to reducing the number of years below 10 for each of the "periods" which are centered on 1979
and 1989.  When we use only the responses for 1979 and 1989 our estimates begin to loose precision because of the very
small number of observations.
9 See Di Tella et. al. (1997) on this point.12
In column 2 we add our measure of inequality.  The coefficient on inequality is negative but
insignificant.  In the next two columns we add additional macroeconomic variables, and the
coefficient on inequality becomes negative and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
A rise in the Gini of 10 percentage points, equivalent to a rise from the State with the lowest level of
inequality in the sample (New Hampshire) to the State with the highest level of inequality
(Louisiana) leads to a fall in the proportion of people reporting themselves as “Very Happy” of 2.5
percentage points and a rise in the proportion reporting themselves as “Not too Happy” of 5.0
percentage points.  Since 32.2 per cent of Americans reported themselves as “Very Happy” an
increase in inequality of 10 percentage points is expected to bring about an 8% reduction in the
amount of people reporting themselves in the top happiness category.  Since 11.5 per cent of
Americans reported themselves as “Not too Happy” it would also correspond to a 43% increase in
the number of people reporting themselves in the bottom happiness category.
In column 4 we add further controls for the level of state unemployment and the national inflation
rate.  The coefficient on inequality retains its significance and falls only slightly in (absolute)
magnitude.  However the coefficient on output now loses its significance.  It is now the aggregate
(state) unemployment rate that brings unhappiness, even after controlling for whether or not the
respondent has a job.  Note that, unlike inequality, unemployment data are available for every year in
the sample.  A one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate (equal to 0.02) increases
the proportion of people reporting themselves as “Not too Happy” by 1.7 percentage points, which
corresponds to an increase of 15 percent of people self declaring themselves “Not too Happy”
(from 11.5 per cent to 13.2 per cent).
One of the reasons why inequality may bring unhappiness is because it is correlated with crime.  In
Appendix 4 we show that these results on inequality do not change even after controlling for crime,
measured by murder rates.  It turns out that the coefficient on this measure of crime has the
“correct” sign but it is not statistically significant.  Experiments with additional crime data (available
upon request) confirm this result.  We have chosen not to include crime variables in our
specification since the best available European crime data had serious consistency problems that
made comparisons with the US unfeasible.  Various experiments with (imperfect) crime data for the
European panels did not change the nature of our results.13
In Table 3.2 we report the identical regressions of Table 3.1 but partitioning the sample across
ideological lines.  We classified as “left” the respondents that replied 0, 1 or 2 to the question
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?”, where 0
equals “Strong Democrat”, 1 equals “Not very strong Democrat” and 2 equals “Independent, close to Democrat”.
We classified as “right” the respondent that replied 4, 5 or 6, where 4 equals “Independent, close to
Republican”, 5 equals “Not very strong Republican” and 6 equals “Strong Republican”.  We report only the
“macro” variables, since the individual controls are quite stable and they are very similar between left
and right respondents.  In this table we added two numbers below for each coefficient and standard
errors: these are the effect on the probability of moving from one “level” of happiness to the next,
as a result of one standard deviation change in the corresponding right hand side variable.
Specifically, the top number is the proportion of people who leave (enter) the top happiness
category “Very Happy” and consequently enter (leave) one of the bottom two happiness categories
“Pretty Happy” or “Not too Happy” when this is a negative (positive) number.  The bottom
number is the proportion of people who leave (enter) the top two happiness categories and
consequently enter (leave) the bottom happiness category “Not too Happy” when this number is
negative (positive).
Right wing respondents are unaffected by inequality, while the left leaning respondents display a
negative effect of this variable.  Also, only the left leaning respondents are negatively affected by
unemployment, a result consistent with the “partisan” model of macroeconomics.
10  For the results
reported in column 3, a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate (equal to 0.021)
decreases the proportion of people reporting themselves as “Very Happy” by 1.0 percentage point
and increases the proportion of people reporting themselves as “Not too Happy” by 1.8 percentage
points.
In Table 3.3 we break down the respondents between rich and poor.  A respondent is classified as
“rich” if he/she belongs to the top two income quartiles, and as “poor” otherwise.  Once again, we
do not report the coefficients on individual controls since they are very stable.  An interesting
exception, however, concerns the results on children: while the “poor” display a negative statistically
significant coefficient on children, the rich display a negative but insignificant one.  This suggests14
that a high income may eliminate some of the “stress” associated with raising children, by allowing
for more help, such as day care, nannies etc.
Concerning inequality, we find a striking result, especially if compared with the results for Europe
discussed later.  The poor seem unaffected by inequality.  On the contrary, it is the rich who show a
small effect of increased unhappiness with inequality.  The poor, however, are affected by a higher
level of unemployment (in addition to the personal costs of falling unemployed as picked up by the
personal characteristic controls).  For the rich, the unemployment rate does not seem to significantly
affect their happiness but greater output has a positive affect, at the 10 per cent level of significance.
Using the results reported in column 3 for the poor, a one standard deviation increase in the
unemployment rate decreases the proportion of poor people reporting themselves as “Very Happy”
by 1.4 percentage points and increases the proportion of people reporting themselves as “Not too
Happy” by 2.0 percentage points.
In summary, the preceding results seem to suggest that if there is an overall small effect of inequality
in the US it comes from leftist and rich voters a result which we revisit below.
In Table 3.4 we check the robustness of our results by including, in addition to all the other controls,
also time fixed effects.  The effect of inequality on happiness disappears.  Note, however, that the
time dummies do not “kill” the significance of all the macroeconomic variables.  In fact the effect of
aggregate (state) unemployment remains robust.  Note that since unemployment data are available
for every year and state in the sample, there are a total of 613 separate observations on this variable.
The evidence is also consistent with the partisan model: the leftists and the poor care about
unemployment, the rightists and the rich do not.
4. Happiness and inequality in Europe
Table 4.1 presents pooled ordered logit regressions for the 12 European countries listed above for
all countries and years for which happiness data exist.  There are a total of 271,224 observations.  All
the European regressions control for year, and country, fixed effects.
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In line with our presentation for the US, we first present in column 1 results obtained introducing
only individual controls.  Comparing column 1 of Table 4.1 with column 1 of Table 3.1 one is struck
by the similarities, not only of the sign and significance of the coefficients but often even by their
size.  This is important for two reasons.  First, as for the case of Americans, the answers of
Europeans about “happiness” seem to make sense.  Second, the fact that basic individual
characteristic like age, marital status, unemployment, etc. are correlated to the answer in similar ways
in Europe and in the US suggest that the survey question is interpreted in a similar way in both
places.  Also, our results on individual effects are very similar to Di Tella et. al. (1997).
In column 2 the effect of personal characteristics on happiness is estimated when the sample size is
restricted to only those countries and years for which inequality data exist.  The size and significance
of the personal controls remains similar to column 1.  In column 3 we add the inequality variable.
Although it has a negative sign, the effect is only significant at the 20 percent level.  The result is
similar when real output is included in column 4.  However when a fuller set of macroeconomic
variables is controlled for, including the unemployment and inflation rates, as well as real output,
column 4 shows that inequality can be identified as having a negative effect on happiness at the 5
percent level of significance.
Using the results in column 4, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini across Europe (equal to
0.043) decreases the proportion of people reporting themselves as “Very Satisfied” by 2.1 percentage
points.  It increases the proportion of people reporting themselves as “Not very/at all Satisfied” by
2.5 percentage points.  A 10 percentage point increase in the Gini decreases the proportion of
people reporting themselves as “Very Satisfied” by 5.2 percentage points and increases the
proportion reporting themselves as “Not very/at all Satisfied” by 5.5 percentage points.  Since 26.5
per cent of Europeans reported themselves as “Very Satisfied”, a 10 percentage point increase in the
Gini would correspond to a 20% drop to 21.3 per cent of people reporting themselves in the top
happiness category.  Since 19.6 per cent of Europeans reported themselves as “Not very/at all
Satisfied” it would also correspond to a 28% rise to 25.1 per cent of people reporting themselves in
the bottom happiness category.16
It is worth emphasizing that this table shows that even after including time fixed effects inequality
does reduce happiness.  This result points towards a critical difference between Europe and the US,
which we revisit below.
As for the macroeconomic variables, inflation, which varies both across time and across countries in
Europe, seems important.
11  A one standard deviation increase in the inflation rate (equal to 0.058)
leads to a fall in the proportion of poor people reporting themselves as “Very Satisfied” of 2.6
percentage points and a rise in the proportion reporting themselves as “Not very/at all Satisfied” of
3.1 percentage points.  A 10 percentage point increase in the inflation rate corresponds to a drop of
4.8 percentage points (from 26.5 to 21.7 per cent) in the proportion of people reporting themselves
in the top happiness category.  The effect of unemployment is negative but insignificant as is the
effect of output.  These results hide different effects across income and ideological groups that we
investigate below.
In Table 4.2 we break down respondents into left and right. This is done using a question in the
Eurobarometer asking respondents “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you
place your own views on this scale?” (from 1 to 10).  Respondents were classified as being “left” if their
response was in categories 1, 2, 3 or 4 and “right” if their response was 7, 8, 9, or 10.  We do not
report the individual controls, which look quite stable and do not vary across the political spectrum.
Note that both for the case of the US and of Europe, we leave out those who define themselves as
centrist.  The scale of the response of the left/right dimension was different in the US survey (as
discussed above) and for the Europe survey.  Our results are robust to reasonable changes in the
right/left classification, for instance taking away 4 from the left and 7 from the right.
The left shows a strong aversion to inequality, while the coefficient on this variable for the right
wing respondents is insignificant.  Remember that these regressions, like all others for Europe,
include time fixed effects.  Using the results in the most general specification in column 3 for the
left, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini across Europe (equal to 0.043) decreases the
proportion of leftists reporting themselves as “Very Satisfied” by 4.7 percentage points.  It also
increases the proportion of leftists reporting themselves as “Not very/at all Satisfied” by 3.7
percentage points.  Since 22.0 per cent of leftist Europeans reported themselves as “Very Satisfied”,17
a one standard deviation increase in the Gini corresponds to a drop to 17.3 per cent of left leaning
people reporting themselves in the top happiness category.  Since 23.9 per cent of leftist Europeans
reported themselves as “Not very/at all Satisfied” it would also correspond to a rise to 27.6 per cent
of left leaning people reporting themselves in the bottom happiness category.  These effects are
quite large.
Inflation enters negatively, although it is only significant (at the 10% level) in the equation for the
right.  This group is the only one affected by output, as indicated by the positive and significant
coefficient.  Unemployment has the expected sign, but it is insignificant for both left and right wing
groups.  Although some care must be exercised in looking at this effect due to its high correlation
with output, we note that the pattern of signs and size on both variables are consistent with the
“partisan” model of macroeconomic policy where what matters is the perception of the relative
costs of inflation and unemployment.  This is true also for the results partitioning the sample into
rich and poor to which we now turn.
Table 4.3 presents the breakdown between rich and poor.  A respondent is classified as rich if
he/she is in the top two income quartiles and poor otherwise.  While the poor are strongly affected
by inequality, the rich Europeans seem to be indifferent to it.  Using the results in the most general
specification in column 3 for the poor, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini across Europe
decreases the proportion of poor people reporting themselves as “Very Satisfied” by 3.6 percentage
points.  It also increases the proportion of poor people reporting themselves as “Not very/at all
Satisfied” by 3.0 percentage points.  A one standard deviation increase in the Gini corresponds to a
drop from 23.1 per cent to 19.5 per cent of the poor reporting themselves in the top happiness
category.  Since 24.9 per cent of poor Europeans reported themselves as “Not very/at all Satisfied”
it also corresponds to a rise to 27.9 per cent of the poor reporting themselves in the bottom
happiness category.  Once again, these effects are large.
Unemployment has a large but not precisely estimated negative coefficient for the poor, while it is
very close to zero for the rich.  Both the left and the right have a similar negative coefficient on
inflation.  These results are (weakly) consistent with the partisan model, although a proper test
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across time, while in Europe it varies across time and across countries.18
would use the whole Euro-Barometer sample and not just those countries and years for which
inequality data exist.
12
5. Comparing Europe and the United States
The previous two sections have highlighted important differences on the effect of inequality in
Europe and the US which are summarized in Table 5.1.
The differences between the two sides of the Atlantic are striking.  In Europe the poor and the left
leaning respondents show a strong aversion to inequality.  In the US none of the four groups (poor
or rich, left or right) display aversion to inequality.  In fact, the coefficient on this variable is never
statistically significant when time effects are introduced.  If anything, the rich, more than the poor
show an aversion to inequality in the US, contrary to the result for Europe.
We ran pooled happiness regressions consisting of the combined sample of 41,674 leftist Americans
and Europeans that allowed for differences in the sizes of the coefficients on all the explanatory
variables between these two groups.  This regression was used to estimate whether there exists a
significant difference in the effect of inequality on happiness between the US and Europe (i.e.
comparing columns 3 and 4 in Table 5.1).  We could reject that the coefficients on inequality were
the same for both the US and Europe in favor of a more negative impact of inequality on happiness
for leftist Europeans compared to leftist Americans at the 8 percent level of significance.  Similarly,
across the combined sample of 63,135 poor Americans and poor Europeans there is evidence of a
more negative effect of inequality on happiness for the poor Europeans compared to the poor
Americans, at the 3 per cent level of significance (see columns 7 and 8).  Comparing poor as well as
left-leaning Americans with their European counterparts, there is a greater negative effect of
inequality on happiness for Europeans than for Americans, at the 2 per cent level of significance (see
columns 11 and 12).
As argued in the previous section, the size of the effect of inequality on happiness in Europe is
substantial.  An additional way of looking at the size of this effect is to compare it with the size of
                                                       
12 Using the larger sample, unconstrained by data availability on inequality, Di Tella and MacCulloch (1998) present
stronger results for the “partisan model.”19
the effect of other determinants.  For instance, based upon the results of column (3) of Table 5.1,
one can compute that for a European leftist an increase in inequality equal to one standard deviation
of the Gini corresponds to a drop of almost one quartile down the income distribution.  It also
equals 2.2 times the effect of leaving self-employment.  For the European poor, a one standard
deviation increase in the Gini has the same effect of an increase in inflation of 7 percentage points.
As for the US, once year effects are included, the only sub-sample for which a robust and statistically
significant but small effect of inequality on happiness can be found is for the group of left leaning
rich (see column 14).  The size of the coefficient for the American rich-leftist is not trivial in size.  A
one standard deviation increase in inequality is larger than the effect of leaving self-employment.
6. Conclusion
Countries differ greatly in the degree of income inequality that they tolerate, even at similar stages of
development.  European observers object to the higher (and, for much of the past few decades,
growing) inequality in the US.  American commentators argue that European society’s obsession
with inequality stifles creativity and, paradoxically, creates a vicious circle of welfare addiction of the
poor.  Do these differences of opinion simply reflect different preferences about the merits of
equality on the two sides of the Atlantic?  Furthermore, is a preference for equality just a matter of
“taste,” or does it reflect something else in society, such as the level of social mobility?
Our approach uses the answers to a simple well-being question.  We simply correlate the answers to
the well-being question asked to thousands of individuals in Europe and America over many years
with measured levels of inequality.  All that this method requires is an individual’s ability to
introspect and evaluate his or her own happiness.
Our results show that, controlling for personal characteristics of the respondents, state/country
effects and year effects, Americans are not affected by inequality while there is a well-defined
negative effect in Europe.  We then investigate differences across income and ideological groups. In
Europe, we find that both the rich and the right-wingers are unaffected by inequality. In contrast, we
identify strong negative effects of inequality on the happiness of the European poor and leftists.  In
fact the sign of the estimated effect of inequality on the poor in the US is often positive, implying a20
statistically significant difference between the way the poor are affected by inequality in Europe and
America.  This suggests that European aversion to inequality is not in the “genes” or, more formally,
does not originate in different preferences in the US and Europe.  If the European effect reflected a
“taste” for equality, we would expect to find it at least as strongly in the European rich.  This is
based on the assumption that equality is a luxury good, whose demand rises with income. A more
reasonable interpretation is that opportunities for mobility are (or are perceived to be) higher in the
US than in Europe.  Under this interpretation, a higher degree of inequality is more “informative”
about future individual fate in a perhaps less mobile society, like Europe.21
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Table 2.1
Happiness in the United States: 1975-94.
Reported All Unemployed Marital Status
Happiness Married Divorced
Very Happy 32.17 17.85 39.24 20.02
Pretty Happy 56.37 52.72 53.14 62.06
Not too Happy 11.45 29.43 7.62 17.92
Reported Partisan Support Income Quartiles
Life Satisfaction Left Right      1
st 2nd      3rd    4th
(Lowest) (Highest)
Very Happy 29.93 36.62 24.28 28.73 33.91 41.71
Pretty Happy 57.26 54.89 57.43 58.07 57.53 52.48
Not too Happy 12.81 8.49 18.28 13.20 8.56 5.81
Note: Based on 24,333 observations. All numbers are expressed as a percentage.
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
OUTPUT 613 13536 2075 8738 20721
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 613 0.071 0.021 0.024 0.180
INFLATION RATE 613 0.051 0.027 0.019 0.135
MURDERS 613 8.594 3.434 0.200 20.300
INCOME INEQUALITY 72 0.385 0.028 0.330 0.44626
Table 2.2
Life Satisfaction in Europe: 1975-92.
Reported All Unemployed Marital Status
Life Satisfaction Married Divorced
Very satisfied 26.46 15.21 28.79 18.61
Fairly satisfied 53.96 44.21 54.04 51.00
Not very / Not at all
satisfied
19.59 40.59 17.17 30.39
Reported Partisan Support Income Quartiles
Life Satisfaction Left Right      1st 2
nd      3rd    4th
(Lowest) (Highest)
Very satisfied 21.98 34.88 21.90 24.36 26.81 32.58
Fairly satisfied 54.15 50.97 49.52 54.54 56.71 54.96
Not very / Not at
all satisfied
23.87 14.16 28.58 21.10 16.48 12.47
Note: Based on 103,773 observations. All numbers are expressed as a percentage.
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
OUTPUT 67 7731 1905 2636 12415
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 67 0.093 0.041 0.016 0.220
INFLATION RATE 67 0.081 0.058 -0.007 0.245
INCOME INEQUALITY 67 0.304 0.043 0.229 0.43027
Table 3.1 The Determinants of United States’ Happiness: 1975-94.
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4)








Unemployed -0.707* -0.709* -0.706* -0.693*
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076)
Self employed 0.088 0.089 0.089 0.090
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Retired 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.051
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
School 0.193 0.193 0.194 0.192
(0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.123)
Home -0.034 -0.037 -0.034 -0.034
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Male -0.207* -0.208* -0.206* -0.207*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Age -0.034* -0.034* -0.034* -0.034*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age Squared 4.4e-4* 4.4e-4* 4.4e-4* 4.4e-4*
(6.3e-5) (6.3e-5) (6.3e-5) (6.3e-5)
Education:  College 0.162* 0.165* 0.161* 0.163*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
                   Graduate 0.217* 0.220* 0.215* 0.218*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Marital Status: Married 0.623* 0.621* 0.624* 0.622*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
                         Divorced -0.164* -0.164* -0.164* -0.162*
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
            Separated -0.395* -0.397* -0.391* -0.394*
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
            Widowed -0.347* -0.349* -0.345* -0.345*
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
No. of children:      1 -0.192* -0.191* -0.192* -0.190*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
                               2 -0.142* -0.141* -0.142* -0.140*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
                              >3 -0.199* -0.199* -0.199* -0.197*
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Income Quartile: Second 0.186* 0.185* 0.188* 0.191*
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047)
               Third 0.389* 0.388* 0.392* 0.396*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
               Fourth (highest) 0.629* 0.628* 0.631* 0.634*
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Race: Black -0.470* -0.469* -0.470* -0.469*
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051)
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs. 24,333 24,333 24,333 24,333
Note: [1] Ordered logit regressions all include State dummies. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent
level; Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -1.78 (0.14), 1.21 (0.15) for reg.
(1); -1.99 (0.21), 1.01 (0.21) for reg. (2); -2.11 (0.19), 0.89 (0.19) for reg. (3); -2.89 (0.49), 0.11 (0.49) for reg. (4).28
Table 3.2
The Determinants of U.S. Happiness for the Left and the Right: 1975-94.
Left Right
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality -1.085 -3.572* -3.081* -0.193 -0.469 -0.221
(0.784) (1.364) (1.488) (0.701) (1.708) (1.753)
-0.003 -0.011
-0.067--
-0.009 -3.7e-4 -0.001 -4.3e-4
-0.006 -0.020 -0.017 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
Output 4.8e-5* 1.3e-5 5.3e-6 -1.7e-5
(2.4e-5) (2.8e-5) (3.3e-5) (3.2e-5)
0.010 0.003 0.001 -0.003
0.021 0.006 0.003 -0.008








Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs. 12,343 12,343 12,343 8,760 8,760 8,760
Note: [1] All the regressions are ordered logits. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level;
Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -1.19 (0.26), 1.78 (0.26) for reg.
(1); -1.34 (0.25), 1.63 (0.24) for reg. (2); -2.08 (0.57), 0.90 (0.57) for reg. (3); -4.04 (0.33), -0.93 (0.33) for reg.
(4); -4.06 (0.34), -0.95 (0.35) for reg. (5) and -4.58 (0.80), -1.46 (0.80) for reg. (6). [4] The two cells below each
coefficient (standard error) report the probabilities of shifting between the different happiness categories due
to a one-standard deviation change in the corresponding explanatory variable (see text for more detail).29
Table 3.3
The Determinants of U.S. Happiness for the Poor and the Rich: 1975-94.
Poor Rich
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality 0.186 -0.216 -0.169 -1.253 -4.599* -4.302*
(1.026) (1.190) (1.201) (0.674) (1.174) (1.344)
0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008
0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.030 -0.028
Output 7.8e-6 -3.6e-5 6.4e-5* 4.3e-5
(2.8e-5) (3.0e-5) (2.3e-5) (2.6e-5)
0.002 -0.009 0.008 0.005
0.003 -0.014 0.032 0.021








Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs. 12,140 12,140 12,140 12,193 12,193 12,193
Note: [1] All the regressions are ordered logits. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level;
Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -1.27 (0.39), 1.59 (0.40) for
regression (1); -1.30 (0.36), 1.56 (0.36) for reg. (2); -2.44 (0.60), 0.42 (0.61) for reg. (3); -3.09 (0.37), 0.09 (0.36)
for reg. (4); -3.31 (0.38), -0.13 (0.37) for reg. (5) and -3.75 (0.75), -0.56 (0.74) for reg. (6). [4] The two cells
below each coefficient (standard error) report the probabilities of shifting between the different happiness
categories due to a one-standard deviation change in the corresponding explanatory variable (see text for
more detail).30
Table 3.4
The Determinants of U.S. Happiness including Year Fixed Effects: 1975-94.
All Left Right Poor Rich
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inequality -0.238 -0.343 -1.484 4.521 -5.424
(2.215) (3.211) (3.460) (4.269) (4.261)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.015 -0.010
-0.001 -0.002 -0.009 0.025 -0.035
Output 9.6e-6 1.4e-5 -4.8e-5 -1.5e-5 2.5e-5
(2.8e-5) (3.3e-5) (4.1e-5) (4.8e-5) (3.6e-5)
0.002 0.003 -0.007 -0.004 0.003
0.004 0.006 -0.022 -0.006 0.012
Unemployment Rate -2.701 -2.975* -3.589 -4.135* -1.632
(1.429) (1.392) (2.759) (1.746) (1.664)
-0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.011 -0.002
-0.012 -0.013 -0.017 -0.016 -0.008
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs. 24,333 12,343 8,760 12,140 12,193
Note: [1] All the regressions are ordered logits. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level;
Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -2.16 (1.04), 0.84 (1.04) for reg.
(1); -1.10 (1.42), 1.88 (1.41) for reg. (2); -5.59 (1.39), -2.47 (1.41) for reg. (3); -0.36 (2.11), 2.51 (2.12) for reg.
(4); -4.70 (1.64), -1.51 (1.65) for reg. (5). [4] The two cells below each coefficient (standard error) report the
probabilities of shifting between the different happiness categories due to a one-standard deviation change in
the corresponding explanatory variable (see text for more detail).31
Table 4.1: The Determinants of Happiness Pooled Across 12 European Nations: 1975-92.
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)








Unemployed -0.874* -0.888* -0.886* -0.886* -0.890*
(0.086) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076)
Self employed 0.115* 0.103* 0.109* 0.110* 0.108*
(0.030) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Retired 0.130 0.129* 0.134* 0.134* 0.130*
(0.063) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
School 0.239* 0.174* 0.177* 0.177* 0.176*
(0.069) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Home 0.080 0.068 0.069* 0.069* 0.065*
(0.038) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Male -0.112* -0.123 -0.124 -0.124 -0.126
(0.038) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Age -0.048* -0.054* -0.054 -0.054* -0.054*
(0.004) (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) (0.005)
Age Squared 5.5e-4* 6.2e-4* 6.2e-4 6.2e-4* 6.2e-4*
(4.3e-5) (4.4e-5) 4.4e-5 (4.4e-5) (4.3e-5)
Education to age:  15-18 years 0.083* 0.042 0.044 0.044 0.042
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
    ‡ 19 years 0.202* 0.137* 0.138* 0.137* 0.137*
(0.046) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Marital Status:    Married 0.233* 0.274 0.272* 0.272* 0.271*
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
 Divorced -0.477* -0.545 -0.542* -0.542* -0.539*
(0.060) (0.069) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
 Separated -0.596* -0.542 -0.541* -0.540* -0.540*
(0.070) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113)
 Widowed -0.288* -0.269 -0.271* -0.271* -0.272*
(0.041) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057)
No. of children ‡ 8 &  15 yrs:      1 -0.045* -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 -0.037
(0.020) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
                                                     2 -0.060* -0.062 -0.061 -0.061 -0.060
(0.026) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
                                                   >3 -0.148* -0.214* -0.210* -0.210* -0.207*
(0.045) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Income Quartiles: Second 0.245* 0.294* 0.296* 0.296* 0.297*
(0.023) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
                Third 0.448* 0.493* 0.495* 0.494* 0.493*
(0.030) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
                Fourth (highest) 0.695* 0.775* 0.780* 0.780* 0.783*
(0.034) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05
Obs. 271,224 103,773 103,773 103,773 103,773
Note: [1] The ordered logit regressions all include Country and Year dummies from 1975-92. [2] Bold-face denotes
significant at the 10 percent level; Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -1.32
(0.14), 1.50 (0.16) for reg. (1); -1.48 (0.21), 1.34 (0.20) for reg. (2); -2.49 (0.86), 0.33 (0.85) for reg. (3); -2.92 (0.67),
-0.10 (0.69) for reg. (4); -3.11 (0.87), -0.29 (0.83) for reg. (5).32
Table 4.2
Determinants of Happiness for the Left and Right Pooled Across 12 European Nations: 1975-92.
Left Right
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality -6.767* -6.811* -6.142* -0.850 -1.222 -1.088
(1.332) (1.526) (1.149) (2.381) (2.084) (1.492)
-0.052 -0.052 -0.047 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
-0.040 -0.040 -0.037 -0.008 -0.011 -0.010
Output -1.1e-4 -6.1e-5 1.5e-4 2.3e-4*
(1.6e-4) (1.4e-4) (7.9e-5) (9.5e-5)
-0.037 -0.020 0.025 0.036
-0.030 -0.017 0.064 0.100








Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.27 0.03
Obs. 29,331 29,331 29,331 23,155 23,155 23,155
Note: [1] All the regressions are ordered logits. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level;
Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -3.77 (0.56), -0.95 (0.51) for reg.
(1); -4.87 (1.46), -2.05 (1.50) for reg. (2); -4.15 (1.58), -1.33 (1.58) for reg. (3); -1.85 (1.04), 0.98 (1.06) for reg.
(4); -0.54 (0.94), 2.29 (0.95) for reg. (5); 0.26 (1.53), 3.09 (1.52) for reg. (6). [4] The two cells below each
coefficient (standard error) report the probabilities of shifting between the different happiness categories due
to a one-standard deviation change in the corresponding explanatory variable (see text for more detail).33
Table 4.3
Determinants of Happiness for the Poor and Rich Pooled Across 12 European Nations: 1975-92.
Poor Rich
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inequality -3.731 -3.827* -4.667* -1.091 -1.068 -1.602
(1.754) (1.776) (1.392) (2.149) (2.091) (1.586)
-0.029 -0.030 -0.036 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007
-0.025 -0.025 -0.030 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013
Output -1.0e-4 -1.1e-4 4.2e-5 1.1e-4
(9.1e-5) (8.4e-5) (5.2e-5) (1.1e-4)
-0.035 -0.039 0.008 0.020
-0.029 -0.032 0.016 0.041








Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.03 0.01
Obs. 50,995 50,995 50,995 52,778 52,778 52,778
Note: [1] All the regressions are ordered logits. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level;
Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -3.06 (0.82), -0.42 (0.81) for reg.
(1); -4.07 (0.85), -1.43 (0.88) for reg. (2); -4.81 (0.87), -2.18 (0.86) for reg. (3); -2.45 (0.95), 0.55 (0.94) for reg.
(4); -2.03 (0.76), 0.96 (0.74) for reg. (5); -1.66 (1.38), 1.34 (1.31) for reg. (6). [4] The two cells below each
coefficient (standard error) report the probabilities of shifting between the different happiness categories due
to a one-standard deviation change in the corresponding explanatory variable (see text for more detail).Table 5.1

















































Inequality -3.367* -0.238 -6.142* -0.343 -1.088 -1.484 -4.667* 4.521 -1.602 -5.424 -7.571* 7.203 -4.705* -9.637
(1.460) (2.215) (1.149) (3.211) (1.492) (3.460) (1.392) (4.269) (1.586) (4.261) (1.004) (6.230) (1.355) (5.598)
-0.021 -0.001 -0.047 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.036 0.015 -0.007 -0.010 -0.068 0.025 -0.029 -0.021
-0.025 -0.001 -0.037 -0.002 -0.010 -0.009 -0.030 0.025 -0.013 -0.035 -0.040 0.038 -0.032 -0.059
Output, Inflation
Unemployment
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country / State
Fixed Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00
Obs. 103,773 24,333 29,331 12,343 23,155 8,760 50,995 12,140 52,778 12,193 14,270 6,493 15,061 5,850
Note: [1] All the regressions are ordered logits. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level; Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors)
are -3.11 (0.87), -0.29 (0.83) for reg. (1); -2.16 (1.04), 0.84 (1.04) for reg. (2); -4.15 (1.58), -1.33 (1.58) for reg. (3); -1.10 (1.42), 1.88 (1.41) for reg. (4); 0.26 (1.53), 3.09 (1.52) for
reg. (5); -5.59 (1.39), -2.47 (1.41) for reg. (6); -4.81 (0.87), -2.18 (0.86) for reg. (7); -0.36 (2.11), 2.51 (2.12) for reg. (8); -1.66 (1.38), 1.34 (1.31) for reg. (9);   -4.70 (1.64), -1.51
(1.65) for reg. (10); -4.12 (2.43), -1.48 (2.44) for reg. (11); 1.43 (2.52), 4.33 (2.53) for reg. (12); -4.58 (1.13), -1.59 (1.05) for reg. (13); -4.51 (2.11), -1.38 (2.10) for reg. (14). [4]
The two cells below the coefficients (standard errors) report the probabilities of shifting between the different happiness categories due to a one-standard deviation change in
inequality (see text for more detail).Appendix 1: Description of the Data and the Surveys
Data Description
HAPPINESS: For the US, the individual responses to the US General Social Survey question that reads "Taken all
together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”.
Accordingly, three categories were created. For Europe, the individual responses to the Eurobarometer that
reads: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”.
Responses falling into the two middle categories (“fairly satisfied” and “not very satisfied”) are considered to
have answered the same category. Accordingly, three categories were created.
LEFT/RIGHT: In the US, we classified as “LEFT” the respondents that replied 0, 1 or 2 to the question “Generally
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?”, where 0 equals “Strong
Democrat”, 1 equals “Not very strong Democrat” and 2 equals “Independent, close to Democrat”. We classified as
“right” the respondent that replied 4, 5 or 6, where 4 equals “Independent, close to Republican”, 5 equals “Not very
strong Republican” and 6 equals “Strong Republican”.
In Europe, the classification uses a question in the Eurobarometer asking respondents “In political matters,
people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your own views on this scale?” (from 1 to 10). Respondents
were classified as being “left” if their response was in categories 1, 2, 3 or 4 and “right” if their reponse was
7,8, 9, or 10.
RICH/POOR: A respondent is classified as “rich” if he/she belongs to the top two income quartiles, and as “poor”
otherwise. For the US these quartiles are based on the individual’s position in his/her State in each year. For
Europe the quartiles are based on the individual’s position in his/her country in each year.
MURDER: The number of murders per 100,000 people for each year in each U.S. State. From “Crime in the US”,
various years, FBI, Washington, Government Printing Office.
INEQUALITY: For the US, Gini Ratios by State from the US Census Bureau. For Europe, the Gini Ratios are
obtained from the K. Deininger and L. Squire (1996) World Bank “high quality” data set, described in “A
New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality”, World Bank Economic Review, 10, pp 565-591.
OUTPUT: For the US, the State Annual Series of average per capita personal income supplied by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce. This series was deflated by the CPI to obtain our
measure of real output. For Europe, real GDP per capita at the price levels and exchange rates of 1985,
expressed in U.S. dollars, was obtained from the OECD.
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: For the US, State level unemployment rates supplied by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics of the US Department of Labor. For Europe, unemployment rates are obtained from the CEP
OECD Data set.
INFLATION RATE: For the US, calculated from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) supplied by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the US Department of Labor. For Europe, the inflation rate is measured by the rate of
change in the CPI from the CEP OECD Data Set.Surveys
The United States General Social Survey (1972-1994)
The General Social Surveys have been conducted by the National Research Center at the University of Chicago
since 1972. Interviews have been undertaken during February, March and April of 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976,
1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1994. There were no
surveys in 1979, 1981 and 1992. There were a total of 32380 completed interviews (1613 in 1972, 1504 in 1973,
1484 in 1974, 1490 in 1975, 1499 in 1976, 1530 in 1977, 1532 in 1978, 1468 in 1980, 1506 in 1982, 354 in the 1982
black oversample, 1599 in 1983, 1473 in 1984, 1534 in 1985, 1470 in 1986, 1466 in 1987, 353 in the 1987 black
oversample, 1481 in 1988, 1537 in 1989, 1372 in 1990, 1517 in 1991, 1606 in 1993 and 2992 in 1994).
The Euro-Barometer Survey Series [1975-1992]
The Euro-Barometer Surveys used in this paper were conducted by various research firms operated within the
European Community (E.C.) countries under the direction of the European Commission. Either a nationwide
multi-stage probability sample or a nationwide stratified quota sample of persons aged 15 and over was selected in
each of the E.C. countries. The cumulative data file used contains 36 attitudinal, 21 demographic and 10 analysis
variables selected from the European Communities Studies, 1970-1973, and Euro-Barometers, 3-38.
Data for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United
Kingdom were available for the full sample period which was used (1976-1990) whereas data were only available
from 1981 to 1990 for Greece and from 1985 to 1990 for both Spain and Portugal. The number of observations in
our sample was 4993 for Belgium, 24764 for Britain, 4054 for Denmark, 4346 for France, 5708 for West Germany,
2652 for Greece, 1812 for Ireland, 24189 for Italy, 494 for Luxembourg, 20255 for The Netherlands, 2380 for
Portugal and 8126 for Spain.Appendix 2: Controlling for Murder in the United States
The Determinants of U.S. Happiness Controlling for Murder: 1975-94.
All Left Right Poor Rich
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inequality -2.264* -3.095* -0.210 -0.182 -4.295*
(0.991) (1.495) (1.752) (1.192) (1.347)
Output 6.3e-6 1.5e-5 -1.5e-5 -3.3e-5 4.5e-5
(1.9e-5) (2.8e-5) (3.4e-5) (3.1e-5) (2.6e-5)
Unemployment Rate -3.983* -4.453* -3.127 -5.300* -2.695
(1.238) (1.506) (2.299) (1.260) (1.805)
Inflation Rate 0.176 0.526 0.646 -0.093 0.467
(0.707) (1.071) (1.130) (0.923) (0.967)
Murders -0.011 -0.008 -0.011 -0.013 -0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.017) (0.014)
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No
Obs. 24,333 12,140 12,140 12,140 12,193
Note: [1] All the regressions are ordered logits. p-values are all zeo [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10
percent level; Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) -2.92 (0.48), 0.07 (0.48) for
reg. (1); -2.11 (0.57), 0.87 (0.57) for reg. (2); -4.60 (0.81), -1.48 (0.81) for reg. (3); -2.47 (0.61), 0.39 (0.62) for reg.
(4); -3.79 (0.73), -0.60 (0.73) for reg. (5).
The Determinants of U.S. Happiness Controlling for Murder – Year Effects: 1975-94.
Poor & Rich &
All Left Right Poor Rich Left Left
Dep Var: Happiness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Inequality -0.109 -0.162 -1.388 4.776 -5.391 7.124 -9.078
(2.207) (3.241) (3.529) (4.289) (4.211) (6.178) (5.337)
Output 1.2e-5 1.7e-5 -4.5e-5 -9.9e-6 2.6e-5 -2.0e-5 5.2e-5
(2.8e-5) (3.3e-5) (4.3e-5) (4.9e-5) (3.7e-5) (6.0e-5) (6.3e-5)
Unemployment Rate -2.817 -3.156* -3.667 -4.352* -1.663 -3.463 -3.302
(1.485) (1.488) (2.808) (1.808) (1.687) (2.409) (1.986)
Murders -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 -0.016 -0.002 0.005 -0.033
(0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.017) (0.012) (0.024) (0.019)
Personal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 24,333 12,343 8,760 12,140 12,193 6,493 5,850
Note: [1] All the regressions are ordered logits. p-values are all zero. [2] Bold-face denotes significant at the 10
percent level; Starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level. [3] Cut points (standard errors) are -2.13 (1.04), 0.87 (1.04)
for reg. (1); -1.06 (1.41), 1.92 (1.40) for reg. (2); -5.58 (1.42), -2.46 (1.43) for reg. (3); -0.46 (1.91), 2.41 (1.92) for reg.
(4); -4.69 (1.63), -1.50 (1.64) for reg. (5); 1.42 (2.52), 4.32 (2.52) for reg. (6); -4.48 (2.03), -1.35 (2.02) for reg. (7).http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2001papers/2001list.html